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Melbourne’s Birrarung: the Missed
Opportunity for Collaborative Urban River Governance
David Goodwin 1
Abstract

A report submitted to Victoria’s Minister for Environment, Climate Change & Water in 2015
identified that the mechanisms in place for governance of Melbourne’s Lower Yarra River inhibit
the river’s potential to enhance the liveability of the City of Melbourne. An absence of shared
strategy and coordinated management across multiple government agencies was highlighted.
Recommendations were made for revised governance arrangements, but they have been largely
disregarded. Scholarship of the structure and function of river governance networks is at an early
stage, but this study applies theory from a related field – collaborative governance – to investigate
the implications of this lost opportunity for enhanced collaboration. The study explores the
opportunity to apply an integrated framework for collaborative governance developed by Emerson,
Nabatchi & Balogh, and its constituent elements, to an urban river governance context. The
integrated framework is shown to be a valuable tool for illuminating the drivers, engagement
processes, motivational attributes and joint capacities that can enable shared decision-making and
implementation across multiple organisations and jurisdictions, to achieve desired ends. The study
identifies the need to effectively manage political, legal, socioeconomic and environmental
influences (the system context), along with the constraints of collaboration dynamics, if a
collaborative governance regime is to be successfully implemented. The study identifies that
factors such as interdependence, leadership direction, consequential incentives and uncertainty
play a key role in driving collaboration dynamics, in the context of an urban river corridor. A
collaborative multi-regulator partnership approach is advocated as the immediate way forward for
the Lower Yarra.
JEL classification: G38, L88, Q58, H11
Keywords: Governance, collaboration, partnership, urban river corridors
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1. Introduction
Urban river governance systems in Australia, as in many developed countries, tend to be complex.
This reflects the interconnected nature of urban river corridors, which lie at the intersection of two
domains – the river, and its catchment with the city (Lerner & Holt, 2012). River governance
networks must by necessity involve a wide range of organisations from across public, private and
voluntary sectors (Holt, Moug & Lerner, 2012), due to the integration of ecological, economic and
social knowledge needed to achieve sustainable management of a river (Wood, Handley & Kidd,
1999; Kidd & Shaw, 2000). Complicated governance impedes the activation and effective
management of a river system.
Scholarship of the structure and function of river governance networks is at an early stage, (Holt,
Moug & Lerner, 2012) but insights can be drawn from a related field where the literature is now
well developed - collaborative governance theory.
Definitions of collaborative governance range from those which emphasise “formal, state-initiated
arrangements,” as proposed by Ansell & Gash (2008) “where one or more public agencies directly
engage non-state stakeholders in a collective decision-making process that is formal, consensusoriented and deliberative” to those which encompass “multipartner governance” which can include
“partnerships among the state, the private sector, civil society and the community” (Emerson,
Nabatchi & Balogh, 2011). Such arrangements stand in contrast to “high” approaches grounded in
power differentials that sometimes underpin the actions of regulators and government agencies.
When Emerson, Nabatchi & Balogh’s integrated framework for collaborative governance was
published (Emerson et al, 2011) its authors encouraged the application of their model to new
regulatory contexts in order to operationalise their framework and derive new insights into how its
dimensions and components interact.
This article aims to build a basis for understanding the levers of effective governance of urban
river corridors by means of a case study of the Lower Yarra River in Melbourne. The Lower Yarra
is the segment of river that runs alongside and through Melbourne’s Central Business District,
from the Hoddle Street bridge to the mouth of the river at Williamstown.
What follows is a case study which describes and reviews the inconclusive machinations around
river governance reforms and efforts to develop city-wide strategies for the sustainable
management of the Lower Yarra over the 5-year period from 2015 to 2019. Reasons for the reform
failure are investigated. A documentary review has been undertaken, drawing from publicly
available data including the websites and annual reports of State and local Government agencies
with jurisdiction over the Lower Yarra River and strategic planning processes conducted by those
agencies. Legislation governing the various agencies and describing their responsibilities and
mandates and powers has also been scrutinised.
Applying discourse analysis to the publicly available materials, and reviewing relevant academic
literature, the article explores models of governance that may be applicable to the context of an
urban river corridor.
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The objective of this research is to identify frameworks capable of assisting and informing the
long-overdue task of reforming the cumbersome urban river governance arrangements which
continue to impede the effective management, and activation, of the Lower Yarra.
As Feaver and Sheehy identified, a properly formulated delegation of governance powers should
identify and define the boundary of authority of a regulator’s authority by specifying both the
governance functions the regulator is required to perform and the depth of decision-making
discretion required to perform those functions (Feaver & Sheehy, 2015).

2. River Management Models for River Systems
Lerner & Holt (2012) identified three alternative approaches to the effective management of river
systems: the unicentric; voluntary action; and partnership management.
The centralised or unicentric model - under which a single body has the powers, duties, finance
and skills to deliver integrated management for specified ends - would appear to be the most
straightforward approach, but this method of river governance is only rarely accomplished. A
noteworthy exception from the United States is the case of the Tennessee Valley Authority, created
under statute in the 1930s as an economic development agency and granted powers to address the
interconnected issues of agriculture, power production, navigation, erosion and environmental
improvement (Lerner & Holt, 2012).
By concentrating decision-making authority, a unicentric approach may make it easier to reach
conclusions and take actions but this also gives rise to a number of risks and disadvantages. (Lerner
& Holt, 2012) This approach internalises conflicts. It separates one domain from other relevant
policy sectors, which can be problematic because urban river corridors tend to be situated at the
intersection of domains where there are multiple interests. Centralisation tends to conflict with
principles of broad representation of and accountability to stakeholders (Kidd & Shaw, 2007).
Unicentric approaches can also lead to deficiencies in terms of complacency and give rise to the
issues that come with authoritarian blindness.
A second model, at the other end of the spectrum of river governance models, is the idea of
voluntary action under which citizens and local groups set local priorities, take local action and
have local responsibility. This involves a ‘bottom up’ rather than ‘top down’ approach. An
essential feature of this approach is that groups and citizens have no powers or duties, nor are they
democratically accountable. This model was strongly advocated in the 2010s in the United
Kingdom (and elsewhere) under the political slogan “Big Society”. Lerner & Holt described
important features of voluntary groups’ contributions – they connect with the citizens, are often
effective lobbyists and can frequently mobilise people to take action on the ground (Lerner & Holt,
2012).
An obvious potential deficiency of this approach, if employed in its purest form, is a lack of defined
decision-making structures resulting in unpredictable outcomes. Local groups pursuing voluntary
action tend not to be suited to, nor even wish to, assume management roles; that is not their raison
d’etre. Lerner & Holt (2012) concluded that, in all of the thirteen case studies they examined,
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arrangements which dealt with complex problems through an entirely voluntary approach were
ineffective.
A third model, which exists at a midpoint on the spectrum of river management systems, is
partnership. The partnership model involves stakeholder groups coming together in a formal but
voluntary arrangement to analyse a situation, agree on a strategy and cooperate to deliver that
strategy. This can be achieved without the need for any new legislation or organisation and
therefore, in theory at least, is (relatively) non-disruptive and easy to set up.
There are three principal axes of a multi-dimensional model of partnership management which
need to be addressed - power, representation and process. According to Plummer & Fitzgibbon
(2004) these three axes locate any particular arrangement within the overall space of possible
arrangements. Experience shows that regulatory backing, sufficient finance and skills are essential
to deliver real change. In Lerner & Holt’s sample group of case studies discussed above, successful
projects which dealt with complex and competing issues all had some form of partnership working
with strong leadership, technical expertise available and good engagement with a wide range of
stakeholders. All had regulatory backing so that there were powers available to at least one of the
partners to require actions. All had significant finance available. Partnership also requires
organisations to pool their resources, powers and skills and negotiate compromises between
competing issues (Lerner & Holt, 2012).
The research of Lerner & Holt suggests that a partnership-oriented governance model (based upon
agreement and compromise) has potential to be highly effective in circumstances where there are
complex and competing issues and dispersal of power, duties and finance among multiple actors.
However, to date, there has been very little emphasis on bringing in an overt partnership model to
optimise the governance of the Lower Yarra River. The question arises: if a partnership model is
to be trialed in this setting, what mechanisms must be in place to allow the system to function
effectively?

3. Collaborative Governance – System Context, the Regime & Drivers
Collaborative governance hinges on the robustness of structures and processes for policy
development and decision-making (Berends, Ritter & Chalmers, 2016). Holt, Moug & Lerner
(2012), examined the behaviours of actors in connection with the five major rivers running through
the urban areas of Sheffield in the United Kingdom. Their work demonstrates ways in which
interpretive policy analysis and social network analysis can be combined to reveal network
structures and the leadership characteristics occurring within an interconnected group of
organisations. This unearthed ways in which governance networks can potentially widen the scope
of material and information which actors can access and also, by developing relationships among
actors, facilitate knowledge and the exchange of resources.
An integrative model for collaborative governance proposed by Emerson, Nabatchi & Balogh,
2011 aimed to illuminate the drivers, engagement processes, motivational attributes and joint
capacities that enable shared decision-making, management and implementation across
organisations and jurisdictions. The authors’ objective was to offer a conceptual map by which to
navigate the various dimensions, components and elements of collaborative governance. Their
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integrative framework, depicted in Figure 1 below, was based on a systematic review of a broad
array of relevant literature: Bryson, Crosby and Stone, 2006; Bentrup, 2001; Innes & Booher,
1999; Selin & Chavez, 1995; Daniels & Walker, 2001; Ring & Van de Ven, 1994; Thomson &
Perry, 2006; Wood & Gray, 1991; Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004; Agranoff & McGuire, 2001; Leach,
2006; Agrawal & Lemos, 2007; Emerson et al, 2009.
Emerson, Nabatchi & Balogh’s framework was intended to have potential application in a range
of sectors and contexts. They anticipated that applying the framework to various regulatory
contexts would lead to further insights into the conditions required for a collaborative governance
regime to be successfully established and elaborate how the dimensions, components and elements
within their framework interact. A need for further theory testing was recognised, in order to
operationalise the proposed integrative framework and its components. The Emerson et al
framework has been applied, for example, to the context of reform of Western Australia’s ‘Alcohol
and Other Drug’ sector, where it was found to be a useful structure for the explication of
collaborative governance (Berends, Ritter & Chalmers, 2016).
The integrative framework, which is readily applicable to the context of urban river governance,
consists of three nested dimensions.
Figure 1 - Emerson, Nabatchi & Balogh's Integrative Framework for Collaborative Governance
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The first dimension that Emerson et al suggest be considered is the system context - the host of
political, legal, socioeconomic, environmental and other influences that affect, and are affected by,
the collaborative governance regime. Included in the seven elements they suggested constituted
the system context were (see Table 1 below) “policy legal frameworks” and “prior failure to
address issues” as well as “trust”. These influences generate opportunities and constraints and
influence the dynamics of the collaboration. As will be evident from the discussion in sections 5,
6 and 7 of this article, below, it is important to not only review the history of the failed Lower
Yarra River reform processes of 2015-19 but also to identify levels of suspicion and mistrust that
may linger amongst stakeholders.
Within a given system under study, it is important to surface institutional, interpersonal and other
risk factors which exist and could potentially affect the dynamics and performance of
collaboration, at the outset or at any time during the life of a partnership model. The kinds of
factors which may potentially influence the nature and prospects of collaboration include: resource
conditions in need of improving (this could include concerns over ongoing access to funding);
historic levels of conflict among recognised interests and resulting impact on working relationships
(Ansell & Gash, 2008); political dynamics and power relations within particular communities or
across levels of government; and the degree of connectedness within and across existing networks
(Selin & Chavez, 1995).
The system context links to the second dimension of Emerson et al’s framework - the collaborative
governance regime (CGR) itself: the particular system for public decision-making which permits
cross-boundary collaboration. Each CGR has its own distinctive collaborative dynamics and
actions that shape the extent to which the regime can be effective. Collaborative dynamics consist
of three interactive components: principled engagement, shared motivation and capacity for joint
action. These three components work together in an interactive and iterative way to produce
collaborative actions – the steps taken to implement the shared purpose of the CGR. These steps
can lead to ‘impacts’ (actions both within and external to the regime) and potential ‘adaptation’
which can transform a complex situation or issue. Focused attention to all three of the interactive
components of collaborative dynamics - by all parties expressing a commitment to collaborative
governance - is essential if effective governance is to be achieved.
From the system context and the CGR emerge the third dimension, drivers, which set the direction
for the CGR and play a crucial role in its establishment. A key proposition was advanced by
Emerson, Nabatchi & Balogh: “One or more of the drivers of leadership, consequential incentives,
interdependence, or uncertainty are necessary for a CGR to begin - the more drivers present and
recognized by participants, the more likely a CGR will be initiated”. 2 They drew a distinction
between the kinds of “contextual variables” they saw as comprising the system context and these
four “essential drivers, without which the impetus for collaboration would not successfully unfold”
(Emerson et al, 2011).

This was the first of ten ‘propositions’ presented by the authors (as a first cut) in an effort to describe the causal
mechanisms that link the components and elements of the nested dimensions in the framework. The ten propositions
were described as preliminary working assumptions in need of future testing and validation.

2
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Table 1 - Emerson, Nabatchi & Balogh's Diagnostic or Logic Model Approach to Collaborative Governance

4. The Case Study – the Birrarung Described
Modern governance systems, as well as being dictated by geography, can be viewed as derivatives
of the history of the area where they are situated – a melange of geographical and historical factors.
The City of Melbourne in the southeast of Australia had its genesis as an illegal squatter camp
established by European colonisers in 1835, (Boyce 2012) near the mouth of an ancient river. This
watercourse was given the name ‘Yarra’ when the early European settlers misinterpreted the
pronunciation of Aboriginal words for the term ‘it flows’. 3 The river, called ‘Birrarung’ by the
indigenous inhabitants of what is now Victoria, has been significant in the development of the City
of Melbourne in a range of ways. It was initially a source of fresh drinking water. The river, as it
existed for millennia up to the early 1830s, was:
A radically different watercourse than the one that exists today, which from the presentday Botanic Gardens to Port Phillip Bay now flows through an almost totally artificial
channel. The river was tidal up to a rocky basalt ledge (where Queens Bridge now stands),
at which point it was as much as ninety metres wide. What the British would call ‘the falls’
acted as a barrier to the saline tidal flows, ensuring that upstream of the rocks could be
found a permanent source of fresh water (Boyce, 2012; citing Presland, 2008).
Melbourne experienced rapid population growth from 1850 onwards as the result of Victoria’s
gold rush and the subsequent pastoral boom in the city’s hinterland. In the 1880s, after nearly 50
years of European settlement, as a flood mitigation measure, the falls were dynamited and water
levels re-set. Throughout the 1880s, major engineering and canalisation works undertaken by
3

See https://yarrariver.melbourne/history (Accessed November 2021).
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teams of engineers under the leadership of Sir John Coode, fundamentally re-routed the course of
the river, establishing the ‘Victoria Harbour’ precinct. In the subsequent decades the ‘Lower Yarra’
was largely turned over to industrial and maritime commerce uses, accompanied by significant
pollution and environmental degradation.
During the mid-twentieth century, there were moves to create, protect and extend ‘green’ and
recreational corridors along the river, with a focus on recreational uses including rowing, walking
and cycling. Substantial capital-intensive urban renewal projects were pursued in the 1990s and
early 2000s, including the refashioning of the then largely derelict ‘Docklands’ and ‘Southbank’
precincts which today feature a large sporting stadium, a major casino and high-end apartment
accommodation and modern commercial buildings. Environmental management and recognition
of indigenous interests are current regulatory focus areas.
This pattern - initial concerns with water supply safety, flood control and other basic functions,
followed by a phase in which the industrialisation of the city and maritime-based commerce
become the preoccupation, then waterfront landscape construction and development and general
civic amenity, leading to contemporary priorities such as ecological restoration and recognition of
indigenous custodianship – is broadly consistent with a schema identified by Hu by which riverine
cities tend to develop (Hu 2016). Over time, priorities for urban river management tend to progress
through a series of stages, as economic development occurs.
The Yarra River has become central to Melbourne’s successful promotion of itself as an
internationally renowned ‘destination’ - a ‘lifestyle’ city known for its parklands and its hosting
of major cultural and sporting events including the Australian Open tennis, Formula 1 Grand Prix
and festivals such as ‘Moomba’. Such events showcase the river and its environs.
However, the level of development and urban renewal achieved to date for the Lower Yarra, and
the contribution the river currently makes to the civic amenity of the city, falls significantly short
of its potential and compares unfavourably with benchmark cities around the world. 4
What has held the revitalisation of the Lower Yarra precinct back? Whilst there are a range of
factors, an aspect frequently cited is its governance arrangements.

5. The Fragmented Governance of Use of the Lower Yarra River
At one level the complexity of the regulatory arrangements for the Lower Yarra is understandable,
in view of its historical context. For major cities, river governance systems are a mirror of social
history. Governance structures tend to develop gradually over time, reflecting the prioritisation of
certain functions (for example, water supply safety, economic activity generation or environmental
management) at particular points in a river’s history. Only rarely do the custodians of river systems
get to ‘start with a clean piece of paper’ in designing governance systems that conform to modernday norms.
Chicago’s Riverwalk is an often-referenced example of best practice – see the City of Melbourne’s ‘Yarra River –
Birrarung Strategy’ of December 2019 https://hdp-au-prod-app-com-participate-files.s3.ap-southeast2.amazonaws.com/6515/7542/1939/Part_1_Yarra_River_Birrarung_Strategy_LOW_RES.pdf (Accessed November
2021)
4
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Nevertheless, the arrangements that pertain to the Yarra are abnormally fragmented. A
comprehensive mapping of the governance use frameworks that afflict the Lower Yarra River was
undertaken in 2015 by a Committee of Inquiry into the governance of the Lower Yarra River
(Lower Yarra River Use Future Directions Group Report, 2015). This was initiated by the State of
Victoria’s Minister for Environment, Climate Change & Water. 5 The Committee was called the
Lower Yarra River Use Future Directions (‘LYRUFD’) Group. 6 It had a particular focus on how
to achieve ‘activation’ of river-based commercial enterprises.
The work of this Group identified twelve distinct clusters of regulation or oversight.
Table 2: Clusters of regulation or oversight of Melbourne’s Lower Yarra River 7
Overseeing Body
Parks Victoria

City of
Melbourne

Other
Municipalities

Description
Parks Victoria is responsible for the management of recreation, leisure and
tourism for all waterways under the Water Industry Act 1994 (Vic) including
recreational activities on the Yarra and Maribyrnong Rivers. It also has
responsibility for waterways management under the Marine Safety Act 2010
(Vic). Parks Victoria is responsible for managing facilities for navigational safety
and port infrastructure for commercial activities, in an environmentally
responsible manner. It has a delivery function for the management of berths
on the Yarra and Maribyrnong Rivers.
The City of Melbourne, though the municipal local government authority
which might be expected to exercise significant control of its river systems, in
fact has quite limited powers. The City’s website says “Specific to the lower
Yarra River, the City of Melbourne is responsible for the lower and upper
promenade of the Southbank, leasing of rowing sheds and tourist signage in
the area” and in addition has “powers to carry out activities under the Local
Government Act 1989.” According to that website “Along with Development
Victoria and Parks Victoria, we share responsibility for coordinating waterways
development, provision of infrastructure and the improvement of recreation,
leisure, tourism and water transport.” Separately, the City’s ‘Waterways Unit’
carries out “responsibilities across Docklands waterways precinct as CoM
under the Crown Land Reserves Act. Responsibilities include allocation and
licensing of berths for vessels, direct management of Melbourne City and
Yarra’s Edge Marina, day to day operations of the waterways, contract
management and marina leases management.” 8
Under Melbourne’s dispersed local government model the municipalities of
Yarra, Stonnington and Maribyrnong have jurisdiction over sections of the
Lower Yarra. The municipalities of Moonee Valley and Boroondara also abut
the waterway.

See Attachment 2 to the Lower Yarra River Use Future Directions Group Report presented to the Minister for
Environment, Climate Change & Water in November 2015 (pp 15-16).
6
The LYRUFD Group was chaired by businessman Tony Kelly. Other Group members were representatives from
the City of Melbourne and a range of State Government instrumentalities (Parks Victoria; the Department of
Economic Development, Jobs, Transport & Resources; the Department of Environment, Land, Water & Planning),
Melbourne Convention & Exhibition Centre, the Melbourne Passenger Boating Association and the Yarra River
Business Association.
7
This table has been updated, and reflects the position as at 30 November 2021.
8
See www.melbourne.vic.gov.au (accessed March 2021).
5
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Department of
Environment,
Land, Water &
Planning
Department of
Transport

This Department has responsibility for the development of policy and
legislation advice relating to the management of public land and water and a
policy function in relation to berths. It provides policy advice on marine
conservation, coastal issues and local ports.
This Department is responsible for development of policy and legislation
advice relating to maritime safety and ports.

Maritime Safety
Victoria

This State-level regulator of maritime safety is responsible for determining
standards and procedures for navigation and maritime safety on State waters.

Water Police

The police service is responsible for law enforcement on the water, search and
rescue and coordination of marine incidents involving recreational vessels,
yachts, fishing vessels and commercial vessels in port.
There are a range of Associations which provide advocacy for local businesses
and are therefore prominent stakeholders. These include the Yarra River
Business Association and Docklands Chamber of Commerce.
This body, formerly named Places Victoria, is the State Government’s property
development agency delivering urban renewal for defined precincts including
Melbourne’s Docklands and Fisherman’s Bend.
The Port of Melbourne Corporation has prescribed responsibilities for the
management and development of the Port of Melbourne. This includes
channel services, berthing services, cargo marshalling facility services and
other services that allow access or use of port infrastructure.
This is the environmental regulator for pollution issue, with responsibilities for
provision of independent assessment, reporting and advice about water
quality issues.
This agency leads and coordinates water quality management for the Yarra
River. It is responsible for “the environmental management of all waterways,
including the bed and banks of the lower Yarra River. This includes drainage
and sewage systems, treating and supplying drinking and recycled water and
flood protection.” 9

Business
Associations
Development
Victoria
Port of
Melbourne
Environment
Protection
Authority
Melbourne
Water

It is notable that many of the regulators listed above consider themselves to have responsibility for
establishing a Vision and Strategy for the City’s river system. A party wishing to start up an activity
in the Birrarung precinct, whether on-water or along a riverbank, is obligated to conduct detailed
discussions with a multiplicity of agencies.
The LYRUFD Group came to the following troubling, but accurate, conclusions:
The current management of the Lower Yarra River is not realising the potential it has to add
to Melbourne’s liveability and its role as a leading world city. There has been no clear
governance direction, shared vision or strategy for the holistic management of the Lower Yarra
River … Consequently development of tourism, commercial activities, recreational use and
everyday activation on the Yarra River has not kept pace with development along the banks of
the river … There are many government authorities with a role in managing on river activities,
but no one agency has the responsibility for the vision, activation of the river and the economic
growth that will deliver jobs and tourism value … Very significant private equity [is
potentially] available to invest in river operations, specifically in integrating land-based
9

ibid.
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infrastructure with on-water activity [but] those interests will not consider investment in the
waterway under the current governance regime. 10

6. The Recommendations of the LYRUFD Group
When they delivered their Report to the Minister for Environment, Climate Change & Water in
November 2015, the members of the LYRUFD Group provided clear and compelling
recommendations for addressing the Lower Yarra’s overly complex regulatory arrangements.
Their Report recommended the formation of an interim Committee charged with working towards
a single, independent waterways authority, and argued for a single independent port authority to
govern the local waterways. It advocated entirely new governance arrangements, to be led by an
independent and interim advisory body consisting of three government appointed members, who
would work with the incumbent regulator Parks Victoria to manage the waterway. 11 The suggested
name for this body - which would employ a CEO and draw support from Parks Victoria and the
City of Melbourne – was the Lower Yarra Port Board.
The LYRUFD Group unanimously recommended a single entity be created to be fully responsible
for on-river activities and supporting infrastructure. It was proposed that a new local port and Port
Manager be established covering the waters and gazetted lands (i.e. berths) of the Lower Yarra
and Lower Maribyrnong Rivers, with this new port to be created using existing legislative and
administrative instruments. 12 A key obligation would be to establish a ‘Management Committee’13
with prescribed functions for the Lower Yarra and Lower Maribyrnong Rivers, as follows: 14
•
•
•
•
•
•

Commence the implementation of the Vision for the Lower Yarra by coordinating the
efforts of the existing agencies and provide a single point of contact for the private sector
and waterway users;
Develop a 'Yarra River Economic Development Strategy' in collaboration with
stakeholders including updating the strategies for tourism, recreation and economic
development activities on the Lower Yarra;
Oversight the tender process for passenger boat berths and finalise site selection for ‘backof-house’ facilities and ensure this land is secured for development of the facilities;
Provide a single point of contact for the private sector looking to invest in and use the
Lower Yarra River;
Prepare business cases for future investment and facilitate investment from the
Government and the private sector to improve the amenity of on-water activities;
Coordinate marketing and promotional materials for the Lower Yarra; and

LYRUFD Group Report, 2015
Parks Victoria were given the option of having a fourth member on the Committee.
12
The Minister for Environment, Climate Change and Water could ask the Minister for Ports to recommend the
Governor in Council appoint a new Port Manager and place certain obligations on that manager.
13
The Management Committee would be headed up by a high profile influential and independent chairperson with
demonstrated capability to work across government and the private sector, a track record of achievement,
commercial acumen and experience relevant to waterways management, with other members of the Committee to
have skills in economics, marketing and water safety.
14
The Committee would be supported by its own dedicated management team comprising a new CEO and
Marketing Manager, but draw on the maritime resources of the existing agencies.
10
11
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•

Assist the Government in continuously improving governance arrangements.

The report also addressed the degree of autonomy of the Management Committee:
The private sector preference is that the new Port Manager and Management Committee
effectively be a new entity which is independent and not under the auspices of any existing
authority. They prefer that the new entity have its own budget, identity and branding …
The private sector believes this level of autonomy is more likely to attract critical private
investment and provide new momentum. 15
On funding, it was recommended that the new governance arrangements be supported by a secure
budget and revenue stream, drawn from existing budgets of government agencies plus additional
funding on a business case basis. Additional funding of at least $650,000 per annum was estimated
to be required. It was anticipated that some marketing funds would be available from existing
organisations to develop the brand of the new entity. 16 Details would be determined through a
collaborative approach to implementation.
The Report recommended an agreed vision for the river, a plan for the renewal of berthing licences,
strategies for new infrastructure to support on-river activities, investing in dredging of the Yarra
River and an improved process for event approvals.
Sensibly, the LYRUFD Group recommended that future governance arrangements should be
guided by a series of principles: an integrated approach to holistically manage the land and
waterway across the Lower Yarra; 17 simplified decision making and approval processes; 18 clear
responsibility and accountability; decision making processes that are equitable, open, transparent
and efficient; opportunities for waterway users including commercial operators to influence
decision making; a conduit to private funding and investment; and a secure revenue stream to
support infrastructure creation and maintenance.
An alternative (but less preferred) option was also identified: that Parks Victoria become the Port
Manager with the Management Committee to be under the auspices of Parks Victoria. 19 This
option was, unsurprisingly, favoured by Parks Victoria. Under this model Parks Victoria would
provide the management support and appoint a new general manager (or similar) to lead the work
and a marketing manager to support the Management Committee. Management support staff
would be employees of Parks Victoria, but report in a matrix arrangement to Parks Victoria line
management and to the Chair of the Management Committee. Day to day operational activities
were to stay with Parks Victoria and other agencies to ensure the Management Committee
concentrated on strategic issues and its delineated responsibilities.

LYRUFD Group Report, 2015.
This would include the Yarra River Business Association, Docklands Chamber of Commerce and Destination
Docklands.
17
Both the berths and on-water activities.
18
A “one stop shop” was seen as very important to encourage investment in on-river activities.
19
It was noted that Parks Victoria is an experienced Port Manager and is currently the local port manager in Port
Phillip Bay and elsewhere.
15
16
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After some late dissension with Government representatives, as a compromise, the private sector
representatives on the LYRUFD Group agreed to support this alternative option, which would
maintain a lead role for Parks Victoria. They attached some provisos: that the Management
Committee members be entrepreneurial with the ability to attract private industry investment and
the ability to enable activation of the river; the Management Committee be distinct from Parks
Victoria and known as the Lower Yarra Port Board or similar; and that the Management
Committee have a much higher status and greater influence than an advisory body. It was proposed
that Parks Victoria should place one of its Board members on the Management Committee.
These potential alternative arrangements were to be deemed to be interim and subject to a
Ministerial review after 18 months, with the option of creating a fully autonomous entity remaining
on the table. 20

7. The Outcome and its Aftermath
Initially, according to media reports, there was a consensus position supporting the preferred
LYRUFD Group recommendations. However, Parks Victoria unexpectedly withdrew from the
consensus position at the final meeting of the LYRUFD Group on 16 October 2015.
After the LYRUFD Group report was published, there was a period of ministerial consideration,
but it appears the Government rejected the Group’s recommendations almost immediately.
Interested media thought, as early as February 2016, that the Minister had rejected the proposed
governance reforms, although it took some time for confirmation of this position to be arrived at.
A review of the publicly available materials creates the impression that the events that transpired
were the result of a rear-guard ‘power play’ by Parks Victoria, who expressed concern at the
possibility of losing a slice of budget funds. Speaking publicly in July 2016 the CEO of Parks
Victoria cast doubt on whether an independent authority would be established in the future, noting
that a number of other reviews were underway. 21
Another possible explanation for the Government decision is that it had decided, by the end of
2015, to proceed with a comprehensive ‘50 Year Community Vision’ planning process for the
entirety of the Yarra River (from the Yarra Valley headwaters to the river mouth), led by
Melbourne Water as the lead agency – in effect prioritising the Government’s reconciliation
agenda over river activation. 22 In December 2015 the Minister for Planning and the Minister for
The Management Committee was to provide six-monthly updates to the Minister for Environment, Climate
Change and Water and the Minister for Ports and meet to discuss issues when needed.
20

See https://www.southbanklocalnews.com.au/editions/article/interview-with-bradley-fauteux/;
https://www.southbanklocalnews.com.au/editions/article/questions-aplenty-for-lunch-speaker_5416/;
https://www.southbanklocalnews.com.au/editions/article/parks-boss-addresses-businesses_5510/ (Accessed
November 2021).
22
The Melbourne Water-led planning process, concluded in 2020, involved municipal government representatives
from along the length of the river system and traditional owners but not commercial interests or civic groups. The
resulting ‘Yarra Strategic Plan’ was developed by a ‘Yarra Collaboration Committee’ made up of representatives
from the Wurundjeri Woi wurrung Cultural Heritage Aboriginal Corporation as well as 15 state and local agencies
who manage the Yarra River corridor. This activity made a positive step forward by acknowledging the importance
21
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Environment, Climate Change & Water had established an additional review group, the Yarra
River Protection Ministerial Advisory Committee, tasked with “engaging with the community, and
other stakeholders, and to provide advice and a recommended action plan for the improved
management, promotion and protection of the entire length of the Yarra River (excluding the Port
of Melbourne waters and the regulation of on-water activities, commercial boats and berthing)”. 23
This began the process which led to the passage of the Yarra River Protection (Willip-gin
Birrarung Murron) Act 2017, which elevated the position of traditional owners in decisionmaking.
In any event, the result of the decisions taken was that the status quo of cumbersome governance
arrangements for the Lower Yarra has persisted. The Strategic Plan produced by the Yarra
Collaboration Committee advocated, over time, better ‘cross-boundary management’ but the focus
of its comments was on collaboration between arms of Government. The content of the Strategic
Plan is an incomplete response to the full gamut of issues surrounding the Lower Yarra, with
limited attention to commercial concerns. A healthy approach to the next stage of detailed planning
would see a full range of stakeholders encompassed within integrated planning processes and not
limit involvement to those operating within the Government sector ‘bubble’. 24
There was also a response of sorts by Parks Victoria. In December 2016, its Board “established a
three-person Lower Yarra River Management Advisory Committee (‘LYRMAC’) with Terms of
Reference approved by the Department of Environment, Land, Water and Planning (DELWP) and
the Minister for Energy, Environment and Climate Change” charged with a further review of river
issues (Parks Victoria Annual Report 2018/19) 25.
It is unclear when the LYRMAC Committee reported but its terms of reference said its term ran
until 30 June 2018. Presumably, therefore, the Committee finally reported to the Parks Victoria
Board around that time, after 18 months of considerations. The details of its report “Lower Yarra
River: Recommendations on Future Funding, Governance and Strategic Considerations for
Management of the Lower Yarra River” were not publicly aired until a Freedom of Information
request was made in late 2018, by the newspaper Docklands News.
On governance, the primary recommendations of the Parks Victoria Committee were - under a
heading “Parks Victoria and City of Melbourne Alignment” - that work take place “to drive a
single strategy and aligned programs of work for the River” (Rec 4.2, p 9) and that “the Minister
consider the formation of a Yarra River Management Committee comprising Parks Victoria, City
of Melbourne, Melbourne Water and Traditional Owners” (Rec 4.2.1, p 10). A recommended
of strong engagement with the indigenous representative body, but there was limited engagement with other
stakeholder groups until nearly the end of the process.
23
The five-member Ministerial Advisory Committee was chaired by Mr Chris Chesterfield.
24
It is noteworthy, given the focus of this paper, that the Strategic Plan produced by the Yarra Collaboration
Committee seeks to embed “long-term change in the way government agencies and councils work together” in the
Yarra River corridor. To embed collaborative management of the Yarra River corridor, the plan proposes that four
changes be implemented over the next 10 years: rolling three-yearly implementation plans and whole-of government
decision-making; coordinated investment decisions; involvement of all stakeholders in taking care of the river; and
support for Government agencies and Traditional Owners. The aim is to demonstrate “a serious commitment to
cross-boundary management of the Yarra River” (see page 26 of the Draft Report of the Committee).
25
The Committee’s terms of reference required “membership of the Committee to comprise one Board member
from Parks Victoria, a Councillor from the City of Melbourne and a person nominated by the private sector”.
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action was that “Parks Victoria Waterways District and City of Melbourne Waterways Operations
Group develop a small working group to meet regularly to progress alignment” (Rec 4.2.1 viii.)
This should have occurred from July 2018 onward but there is nothing to indicate that this working
group met over the subsequent two years.
In late 2018, after finally obtaining a copy of the Parks Victoria Committee’s report via its Freedom
of Information request, Docklands News observed that the earlier sensible suggestions of the
LYRUFD Group were not to be carried through, but the report to the Parks Victoria Board
“recommended adding two more players into the mix at the highest level – Melbourne Water and
‘traditional owners’.” It also noted the Committee’s recommendation that whilst the “Lower Yarra
Management Committee” should report to the Parks Victoria Board, other stakeholders and river
users should feed their views into that Lower Yarra River Management Committee.
The conclusions reached by Docklands News were scathing. Commercial operator Jeff Gordon
was quoted saying “PV has secured its grip over the waterways” whilst journalist Shane Scanlan
opined: “The winners are the bureaucrats who have secured their short-sighted right to hold
Melbourne back” and that “a high-performing commercial operator assessing Melbourne as a place
to introduce river-commuter ferries would take one look at the governance structure and run 100
miles.” 26
The end result of the processes described above is that considerable time has been wasted, at
considerable expense. Very little seems to have moved beyond “planning to plan”. There were
lower than expected levels of engagement by Parks Victoria over the 2017-19 period and it seems,
as at the end of 2019, only a small amount of change had been operationalised.
The lack of progress in addressing governance deficiencies was highlighted by familiar
observations contained within the City of Melbourne’s 2019 ‘Yarra River – Birrarung Strategy’
document (which was arrived at following a six-month long process of public consultation). This
said:
The overall management of the river is highly complex and fragmented. Many of the
opportunities for the river corridor are outside of direct City of Melbourne control and
within the jurisdiction of other government agencies or the private sector. Many of the
issues and inconsistencies along the river, including challenges from activation proposals,
come from organisations operating independently and with different remits. 27
The City of Melbourne River Strategy document went on to describe the Lower Yarra as affected
by “complex land ownership and governance arrangements” which “challenge decision making
and the delivery of change.” The City of Melbourne also observed that “the substantial potential
of the Yarra River corridor asset as a living ecological entity remains to be fully realised.” It
identified a need to “rehabilitate and improve the natural space along the river corridor, not only
to benefit the growing population but as a commitment to restoring the ecology of the river.” There
Scanlan, S., Docklands News, 11 December 2018. See
https://www.southbanklocalnews.com.au/editions/article/bureaucrats-formalise-river-governance-malaise_8121/
(Accessed November 2021).
27
City of Melbourne ‘Yarra River – Birrarung Strategy’, 2019, page 7.
26
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was nevertheless seen to be a continuing “opportunity for the environs of the Birrarung, Lower
Yarra to be central to Melbourne’s economy, culture and liveability”. It was noted that
“surrounding uses have little relationship with the waterways and there is limited expression of
cultural heritage.” 28 (City of Melbourne ‘Yarra River – Birrarung Strategy’, 2019)
That such comments continue to be made is a real concern for river stakeholders, given that
potential solutions for addressing the jurisdictional confusion and bureaucratic malaise affecting
the river were clearly diagnosed and spelt out in the LYRUFD Group report four years earlier.
They suggest little has changed in practice. The consequence is that, as at late 2021, following the
two-year period of COVID-19 virus related Lockdowns experienced by the City of Melbourne
over 2020 and 2021, the City remains poorly placed to fully capitalise on river-based economic
recovery initiatives.
The limited outcomes achieved for the Lower Yarra over the five-year period under study here can
be largely attributed to the failure to implement an effective broad-ranging partnership model.
Under a partnership-oriented model, whilst each group retains its own powers and duties, and its
own skills and finances, groups commit to contribute to the collective effort as they are able and
willing. The model creates a hard necessity: all must be achieved by agreement and compromise.
In the wake of the lack of success of attempts over recent years to achieve structural
governance reforms for the Lower Yarra, and given the historical context of the way its governance
arrangements have evolved, it seems obvious, even trite, to say that the approach that must now
be taken to its governance must be highly collaborative. The available evidence suggests that a
collaborative governance approach for this river corridor - rather than a ‘high’ approach grounded
in power differentials - is what is needed at this point in time.29

8. Ways Forward
Although, as yet, there is little indication that, as at the end of 2021, the key regulators have
recognised a partnership model as the approach needed in the Lower Yarra context, the necessity
of partnering is made clear by the academic literature. We can look to the literature for indicators
of the changed behaviours required to enable a culture of collaboration to take root across the bevy
of regulators.
If, in the near future, progress is made towards establishing a partnership model amongst those
with oversight of the Lower Yarra River, a future detailed study of its workings could contribute
rich new insights, by detailing ways in which interdependence, leadership direction, consequential
incentives and uncertainty influence forms of collaboration that can facilitate effective governance
of an urban river corridor. Specifically, it would be enlightening to examine (i) the extent to which
these four drivers were present at various stages in the lead-up to the formation of a fresh
ibid.
A review of the Yarra Strategic Plan process referenced at n 16 above suggests that, whilst the language of
collaboration may be used frequently, the particular form of collaboration which some regulators prefer may be that
between agencies of Government.

28
29
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collaborative governance regime, and to what extent they were influential in the effectiveness of
collaborative governance, (ii) which of the components of collaborative dynamics (principled
engagement, shared motivation, capacity for joint action) are essential for collaborative success,
and (iii) the nature of the causal mechanisms that can drive collaborative initiatives. These were
the categories specifically highlighted by Emerson Nabatchi & Balogh as important areas for
further exploration in order to elaborate the theoretical framework they proposed (Emerson et al,
2011).
For the context of Lower Yarra River governance, it is unlikely that the elements of
interdependence and uncertainty are yet at levels which would catalyse the much-needed changes
to relationship dynamics. The necessary impetus will need to be spurred by either leadership or
consequential incentives. It is important that these domains should be in focus in future efforts to
spark a partnership model.
There would be real value in applying collaborative governance principles and partnership
approaches to the management of the Lower Yarra corridor. It is incontrovertible that, for this river
corridor, a transition to more effective forms of governance is needed.

9. Conclusion
The jury is out as to whether the key agencies and other stakeholder groups interested in the Lower
Yarra have the mindset and skill sets to support decision-making based on cross-boundary
collaboration. Within Melbourne’s maritime community there is currently widespread scepticism
that the key agencies are prepared to relinquish any of the current authority they possess over
aspects of river governance, and a feeling that this limits the potential for a re-design of decisionmaking processes. 30
As the 2015 LYRUFD work showed, for there to be any effective change to past outcomes, it will
be necessary for the Lower Yarra River governance regime to be substantially redesigned to enable
and promote cross-boundary collaboration. Progress can become bogged down in bureaucratic
power games and litigation, as incumbents show themselves to be reluctant to relinquish control.
The legal status by which a party holds land is rarely willingly extinguished or passed to others.
This article has demonstrated that, in the case of Melbourne’s Birrarung, significant enhancement
of approaches to consultation will be required for the deficiencies inherent in overlapping and
complex governance systems to be overcome and river activation delivered.
No significant work has yet been done to assess the ‘state of readiness’ of the current regulatory
agencies for genuine collaboration. There is clear potential for further analysis to be undertaken
through a lens which applies collaborative governance principles to the management of this river
system and assesses the state of readiness of the various regulators involved for a partnership
approach.

A sense of scepticism can be discerned from Position Papers and Notes of Meetings made public over the course
of 2020 and 2021 by Jackie Watts, Chair of the Melbourne Maritime Heritage Network - see www.mmhn.org.
30
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Structural reform (aiming for a single regulator) has already been attempted, but this failed. A new
approach is required. 31 The right way forward for the Lower Yarra now is a multi-regulator
partnership-oriented approach based on principles of collaborative governance.
However, for this to be delivered all key players must commit to working according to that model.
An effective partnership approach requires organisations to pool their resources, powers and skills
and negotiate compromises on points of difference. There will need to be focused attention to each
of the elements identified in the Emerson, Nabatchi & Balogh framework.
Emerson et al’s integrative framework has been shown to be a valuable tool for breaking down
and illuminating the drivers, engagement processes, motivational attributes and joint capacities
that can enable shared decision-making and implementation across multiple organisations and
jurisdictions, to achieve desired ends.
Applying the Emerson, Nabatchi & Balogh framework to the Lower Yarra River context would
lead to pragmatic suggestions as to how the components of a collaborative system could be
‘operationalised’, and also contribute to the further iteration of the framework.
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